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Emerging digital technologies (EDTs),1 (e.g. Internet of Things and of 
Services (IoT/IoS),2 Artificial Intelligence (AI),3 advanced robotics,4 and 
autonomous vehicles (AV)5) can lead to fundamental discoveries, opening up 
new possibilities, and significantly improving the lives of many, particularly, by 
bringing major benefits to our society and economy through better healthcare, 
more efficient public administration, stronger democratic processes, safer 
transport, a more competitive industry, and sustainable farming. Machine-
learning,6 for example, can be used to make more accurate and faster medical 
diagnoses and surgeries,7 carry out dangerous and repetitive tasks, and free up 
valuable time. The Internet of Bodies, that is, the merger of IoT and AI with the 
 
 
1 The category of emerging digital technologies is not fully defined and exhaustively identified in 
European documents on the topic, where they are indicated with the exemplificative list of “Internet 
of Things (IoT), Artificial Intelligence, advanced robotics and autonomous systems”. In this work, the 
wording of the EU institutions is adopted. 
2 IoT is “a global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by 
interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable information 
and communication technologies.” (Recommendation ITU-T Y.2060, June 2012, 
https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/recommendations/rec.aspx?rec=y.2060, p. 1). An overview of the IoT as 
“the next major economic and societal innovation wave enabled by the Internet.”, together with an 
account of technologies and phenomena like personal wearables, smart homes, smart cities, smart 
manufacturing, smart energy, smart farming, and circular economy, are provided in Staff Working 
Document, Advancing the Internet of Things in Europe, 19.4.2016, SWD(2016) 110 final, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016SC0110, accompanying the Communication of 
the European Commission, Digitising European Industry - Reaping the full benefits of a Digital Single 
Market, COM (2016) 180, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0180&from=EN. 
3 According to the definition endorsed at European level, “[a]rtificial intelligence (AI) refers to systems 
that display intelligent behavior by analyzing their environment and taking actions – with some degree 
of autonomy – to achieve specific goals. AI-based systems can be purely software-based, acting in the 
virtual world (e.g. voice assistants, image analysis software, search engines, speech and face 
recognition systems) or AI can be embedded in hardware devices (e.g. advanced robots, autonomous 
cars, drones or Internet of Things applications).” High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 
A definition of AI: Main capabilities and scientific disciplines 1      (2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=56341.      
4 Robotics is interestingly defined as “AI in action in the physical world.”      Not surprisingly, it is also 
referred to as embodied AI.”      For an overview of relevant initiatives of the European Union, see 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/robotics. 
5 An account of the initiatives of the European Union in relation to Connected and Automated Mobility 
(CAM) is available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/connected-and-automated-
mobility-europe. See also Katie Atkinson, Autonomous Cars: A Driving Force for Change in Motor 
Liability and Insurance, 17 SCRIPTED A J. L., TECH. & SOC’Y 125 (2020);      Francesco      Paolo      
Patti, The European Road to Autonomous Vehicles, 43 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.125 (2019). 
6 Machine learning – either supervised, unsupervised or reinforcement learning – is only one of the 
several learning techniques used to train AI, along with, for instance, neural      networks, deep learning, 
and decision trees. The goal is to engineer a general intelligence characterized by autonomy, self-
reflection, self-improvement, and commonsense, in the ambitious attempt to replicate, or even outdo, 
human intelligence. See      PETER VOSS     , ARTIFICIAL GENERAL INTELLIGENCE (Springer 2007). 
7 For instance, neurodegenerative disorders, such as Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s disease, could be 
diagnosed on the basis of mouse flickers registered by an AI application. Ryan      W. White, P. Murali 
Doraiswamy, E     ric Horvitz, Detecting Neurodegenerative Disorders from Web Search Signals, NPJ 
DIGITAL MED. 1      (2018),      https://www.nature.com/articles/s41746-018-0016-6). Characteristics 
and issues of healthcare AI applications are analyzed in Drew      Simshaw, Nicolas      Terry, Kris      
Hauser, M.L. Cummings, Regulating Healthcare Robots: Maximizing Opportunities While Minimizing 
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human body, can allow athletes to track their performance with a watch, truck 
companies to check the alertness of their drivers, and patients to be reminded if 
they forgot to ingest their medication on the basis of a sensor implanted in their 
stomach.8 In more general terms, such technologies have the potential to 
transform products, services, activities, procedures, and practices in several 
economic sectors and in relation to many aspects of society, promising increased 
productivity and efficiency gains. At the same time, EDTs can even play a key 
role with regard to climate and environmental-related challenges, as enablers for 
advancing the 2030 Agenda and attaining the Sustainable Development Goals 
of the Green Deal.9 Moreover, quantum computing is expected to be a game-
changer, thus leading EDTs beyond anything currently envisaged.10 
However, as smart machines develop in a way that makes them pursue their 
tasks with diverse degrees of autonomy,11 their new and enhanced potential 
brings in risks – or increase the existing ones – for both those who offer them 
and those who use them. Indeed, such technologies may have unintended effects 
or be used for malicious purposes. The list of new possible “algorithmic 
damages” is as long and various as the list of new ways to inflict old harms. 
Algorithms trained with biased data may lead to biased decisions to the 
detriment of minorities when screening job candidates, assessing 
creditworthiness for loans, or predicting criminal behaviour.12 Not surprisingly, 
even a chatbot may turn out to be racist13. Autocomplete functions of search 
engines may cause defamation, reputational damage, or trademark violations.14 
Robo-advisors may lead to wrong investments,15 while errors in automated 
diagnoses and surgeries may ruin a person's life. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities 
in smartwatches for children may be exploited to obtain access to the child,16 
while a flaw in the radio of a vehicle could expose the risk of unauthorised access 
by a third party maliciously intending to take over the control system of the self-
 
 
8 Andrea M.      Matwyshyn, The Internet of Bodies, 61(1) WM. & MARY L.      REV.      77 (2019). 
9 Communication of the European Commission, The European Green Deal, COM (2019) 640 final (Dec. 
11, 2019),      https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0640&from=EN. For an overview of Sustainable 
Development Goals, see resources available at      https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/sdi and 
https://ec.europa.eu/environment/sustainable-development/SDGs/index_en.htm. 
10 Commission Staff Working Document, Quantum Technologies, 19.4.16, SWD(2016) 107, 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=15270,  accompanying the Communication 
of the European Commission Parliament the Council, the Europe Economic and Social Committee of 
the Regions, European Cloud Initiative - Building a competitive data and knowledge economy in 
Europe, COM (2016) 178 final (Apr. 19, 2016) , 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=15266. 
11 On the concept of autonomy, see infra para 2. 
12  James Manyika, Jake Silberg, and Brittany Presten, What Do We Do About the Biases in AI?, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (2019), https://hbr.org/2019/10/what-do-we-do-about-the-biases-in-ai.  
13 This occurred with Tay, the chatbot developed by Microsoft to self-learn conversational skills and 
autonomously interact with users via Twitter. It was shut down in 2016. Sarah Perez, Microsoft silences 
its new A.I. bot Tay, after Twitter users teach it racism, TECHCRUNCH (2016), 
https://techcrunch.com/2016/03/24/microsoft-silences-its-new-a-i-bot-tay-after-twitter-users-teach-it-
racism/. 
14 Stavroula Karapapa, Maurizio Borghi, Search Engine Liability for Autocomplete Suggestions: 
Personality, Privacy and the Power of the Algorithm, 23(3) INT’L J. L. AND INFO. TECH. 261 (2015). 
15 Dominic Litz, Risk, Reward, Robo-Advisers: Are Automated Investment Platforms Acting in Your Best 
Interest, 18(2) J. HIGH T. L. 367 (2018). 
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driving car.17 In fact, although autonomous vehicles promise a reduction of 
accidents caused by human errors, flaws in object recognition technologies 
embedded in self-driving cars could still cause accidents, and thus injuries and 
material damage. Similarly, cyberattacks on the control systems of driverless 
metro, autonomous weapons, industrial plants, or critical infrastructures may 
cause enormous damage as well. 
This scenario certainly raises challenges for regulators and policymakers 
that, in the context of an overall strategy for “responsible innovation,”18 have to 
face the ontological difficulty of foreseeing and possibly controlling the impact 
of EDTs on economy and society, to make sure that they are human-centric, 
ethical, explainable, sustainable and respectful of fundamental rights and 
values.19 An ecosystem where both citizens and businesses can trust the 
technology they interact with is, in fact, fundamental to both unlocking the 
potential of the above-mentioned new technologies and enabling them to 
ameliorate people’s lives. An environment of trust and accountability around the 
development and use of AI-powered devices and autonomous self-learning 
systems includes, therefore, the design of legal rules on civil liability20 – or the 
adaptation of existing ones – to the risks generated by their use. 
The adequacy and completeness of liability regimes in the face of 
technological challenges are indeed crucial for society. If the system is 
inadequate or flawed or has shortcomings in dealing with the damages caused 
by EDTs, victims may end up partially compensated. On the other hand, an 
overprotective liability regime risks to stifle the development and use of EDTs 
– and in the last instance, innovation – by introducing systems that 
overcompensate for harm generated during the operation of such technologies.  
In this context, many are the questions that arise and are in need of an 
answer. Does the current legislative framework in the EU address all the possible 
damages that can derive from the use of EDTs, or encompass a general clause 
suitable to cover all of them? What – if any – gaps do the current legal 
framework reveal? What possible amendments are currently being studied and 
proposed? Given the features of emerging digital technologies, would a one-
size-fits-all solution be preferable, or should a technology-specific oriented 
solution be adopted? Does it make sense to recognize autonomous systems as 
legal entities that may be held liable in damages? Should specific obligations be 
 
 
17 On a similar case, see the RAPEX notification from Germany published in the EU Safety Gate website 
(A12/1671/15). 
18 This concept, intended to emphasize the role of responsibility in shaping and promoting innovation, is 
gaining increasing attention among scholars and policy makers. On this, see B.J. KOOPS, I. 
OOSTERLAKEN, H. ROMIJN, T. SWIERSTRA, J. VAN DEN HOVEN (EDS), RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION 2. 
CONCEPTS, APPROACHES, AND APPLICATIONS (Springer 2015). 
19 There is a lively discourse around ethical issues raised by new technologies, as analyzed in M.D. 
DUBBER, F. PASQUALE, S. DAS (EDS), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICS OF AI (Oxford U. Press 
2020);M. COECKELBERGH, AI ETHICS (The MIT Press 2020). With specific regard to algorithmic 
transparency and the need to shift from a black-box society to an intelligent one, see F. PASQUALE, 
THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 218 (Harvard University Press 2015)(“Rather than contort ourselves to fit 
‘an impersonal economy lacking a truly human purpose,’ we might ask how institutions could be re-
shaped to meet higher ends than shareholder value . . . Black box services are often wondrous to behold, 
but our black box society has become dangerously unstable, unfair, and unproductive. Neither New 
York quants nor California engineers can deliver a sound economy or a secure society. Those are the 
tasks of a citizenry, which can perform its job only as well as it understands the stakes”).  
20 This work focuses on civil liability, to be distinguished from criminal. Later in this work, the term 
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imposed on providers of EDTs as to the design of the technology (i.e., “safety 
by design”)? Should safe harbours aim at enabling a data-driven economy be 
adopted? Where to strike a balance between the need to compensate victims and 
encouraging innovation? 
To answer the above questions, one should identify the normative 
foundations on which a liability regime for new technologies may be built on.21 
While it is often maintained that the objective of the liability system is to 
compensate victims, this cannot be the only goal of regulators, but it should go 
hand-in-hand with promoting innovation by providing incentives towards those 
actors who are best situated to take precautions against harm. To do this, it is 
crucial to understand whether the existing rules present gaps in considering the 
possible damages that occur in the context of the use of IoT, AI, advanced 
robotics and autonomous systems, and to identify possible solutions that would 
build trust in these technologies. All this can take place only by striking a balance 
between the need to compensate possible victims and the desire to incentivize 
innovation. The adequacy and completeness of liability regimes in the face of 
technological challenges are indeed crucially important for society. If the system 
is inadequate or flawed or has shortcomings in dealing with damages caused by 
emerging digital technologies, victims may end up totally or partially 
uncompensated, even though an overall equitable analysis may make the case 
for indemnifying them. The social impact of a potential inadequacy in the 
existing legal regimes to address new risks created by emerging digital 
technologies might compromise the expected benefits. In addition, certain 
factors, such as the ever-increasing presence of emerging digital technologies in 
all aspects of social life and the multiplying effect of automation, can also 
exacerbate the damage these technologies cause. Damages can easily become 
viral and rapidly propagate in a densely interconnected society. For these 
reasons, answering the question as to whether the current liability regime is fit 
to encompass the damages that might derive from the use of EDTs is urgent and 
crucial to their own development. The envisaging of possible solutions is also 
crucial were the current liability regime not completely fit to address the changes 
brought about by the EDTs. 
In the following paragraphs, we seek to ascertain whether the current 
liability regimes are fit for the new digital environment and to envisage possible 
measures to face the new reality. To this end, Section 1 preliminary reconstructs 
the current liability framework, which at the European level is quite fragmented 
and only partially harmonised. Section 2 analyses the feature of EDTs to 
illustrate how they challenge the current legal landscape, to the point of 
questioning traditional liability notions – as explained in Section 3. Section 4 
surveys the EU institutions’ position on these challenges and Section 5 focuses 
on the findings of the Report on Liability for AI and emerging digital 
technologies,22 as it provides a valid starting point for discussing any 
adjustments that may be needed. Finally, Section 6 highlights the need for a 
 
 
21 Rolf H. Weber & Dominic N. Staiger, New Liability Patterns in the Digital Era, EU INTERNET L. 197 
(2017). 
22 Report of the Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies - New Technologies Formation, 
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multi-faced approach to tackle the ever-changing issues raised by EDTs through 
an overview of the most viable options to complement liability rules, also from 
an ex-ante perspective.  
 
 
I. THE CURRENT LEGAL LIABILITY FRAMEWORK WITHIN THE EU 
 
To understand how the development and use of EDTs impact the current 
liability notions is necessary to preliminary reconstruct the current liability 
framework, which at the European level is only partially harmonised.23 The 
existing EU tort law rules are, in fact, limited product liability law under 
Directive 85/374/EC (“PLD”),24 liability for infringing data protection law 
(Article 82 of the GDPR),25 and liability for infringing competition law 
(Directive 2014/104/EU).26 There is also a well-established regime governing 
liability insurance with regard to damage caused by the use of motor vehicles 
(Directive 2009/103/EC),27 which though does not touch upon liability for 
accidents itself. Similarly, not dealing directly with liability but with product 
safety is the regime introduced under Directive 2001/95/EC on general product 
safety,28 which requires that products (with the exceptions of pharmaceuticals, 
medical devices, and food) meet all statutory safety requirements provided by 
EU and national laws or comply with national standards. 
Similarly, at a national level, there are no Member States’ liability 
provisions that contain liability rules specifically applicable to damage resulting 
from the use of EDTs, with the exception of those jurisdictions that have 
regulated the use of AVs, where they also provide for coverage of any damages 
caused, by insurance or by reference to the general rules.29 At the moment, 
 
 
23 Ken Oliphant, Cultures of Tort Law in Europe, 3 J. EUR.TORT L. 147 (2012); Mauro Bussani & Marta 
Infantino, Tort Law and Legal Cultures, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 77 (2015). 
24 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and 
Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products (1985) 
O.J. (L 210) [“hereinafter” PLD]. A thorough account of the PLD is provided in D. Fairgrieve, G. 
Howells, P. Møgelvang-Hansen, G. Straetmans, D. Verhoeven, P. Machnikowski, A. Janssen, R. 
Schulze, Product Liability Directive, EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 
OF THE ART IN THE ERA OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 17 (Cambridge U. Press 2016). See also Micheal G. 
Faure, Economic Analysis of Product Liability, EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
STATE OF THE ART IN THE ERA OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 619 (Intersentia 2016). 
25 Commission Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
2016 O.J. (L 119). See also Proposal for Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications, Art. 
22, COM (2017) 10 final. 
26 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on 
Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages under National Law for Infringements of the 
Competition Law Provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA 
relevance, 2014 O.J. (L 349). 
27 Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 Relating 
to Insurance Against Civil Liability in Respect of the Use of Motor Vehicles, and the Enforcement of 
the Obligation to Insure Against Such Liability ,2009 O.J. (L 263). 
28 Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on General 
Product Safety, 2002 O.J. (L 11). 
29 See, among many, Rustin Diehl & Matthew I. Thue, Autonomous Vehicle Testing Legislation: A 
Review of Best Practices from States on the Cutting Edge, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 197 (2016); and, in 
the US: Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability, Automobile 
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therefore, harmful damages that arise during the use of EDTs are likely to be 
compensated under existing rules in tort and contract law.  
In general, domestic tort laws include a rule introducing fault-based liability 
with a broad scope of application, accompanied by several more specific rules 
which either modify the premises of fault-liability (especially in the distribution 
of the burden of proof) or establish liability independently from fault (strict or 
risk-based liability). Most liability regimes also encompass the notion of liability 
for others (indirect or vicarious liability), which can, in turn, be – depending on 
the case or the country – fault- or risk-based.  
While this is not the place to engage in a comparative analysis of each 
Member State’s liability framework, it is worth pointing out that they all share 
some common principles. A general rule of liability for fault is, in fact, part of 
the legal systems of all EU members, and it is also central to the principles 
restating the common core of European private law.30 In a nutshell, when an 
actor fails to take due care, and this negligence causes harm to another – or she 
causes such harm intentionally – this actor is liable to compensate the victim. 
Usually, what triggers liability is harm to the fundamental interests of a person, 
such as life, health, bodily integrity, freedom of movement, private property, and 
in some countries also purely economic losses and harm to human dignity. In 
addition, all Member States’ legal systems encompass product liability as a 
result of the PLD implementation. On this base, a damage claim for harm 
generated by a defective product does not require a finding of fault on the part 
of the manufacturer, as, in principle, this should be a strict – not fault-based – 
liability.31 However, the regime that the PLD introduces resembles more a 
watered-down version of negligence liability than a strict liability regime since 
a claimant must, in any case, prove the defect and that such defect generates the 
harm that she suffered.32 Moreover, limits to the compensation may be imposed, 
depending on the national implementation of the directive, and manufacturers 
may show that the defect was not linked to their activity (alleging, for example, 
the risk development defence).33 In sum, for as much as product liability could 
be of any use, it only covers damages generated by defective products, leaving 
outside the provision of services, for which then the default negligence-based 
regime revives.  
As a result, the current EU scenario is quite fragmented. In the first place, 
even though fault-based liability is a common ground, negligence and fault can 
be given different interpretations across Member States. In the second place, 
although the PLD should in principle introduce a harmonized strict liability 
regime for defective products, in practice, its implementation has not been 
consistent in all Member States and, in any case, it does not seem to encompass 
many of the instances generated by the use of EDTs.34 In the third place, the 
hypotheses of strict and vicarious liability heavily depend on the traditions of 
 
 
30 EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW (ED), PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW, Art. 1.101 (1)-(2) 
http://civil.udg.edu/php/biblioteca/items/283/PETL.pdf. For a comment, see F.D. BUSNELLI ET AL., 
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW: TEXT AND COMMENTARY (Springer 2005). 
31 Id., Recital 2, “liability without fault”. 
32 PLD, supra note 24, at art. 4. 
33 See infra para. 4. 
34 For a survey of the issues as to the application of the Product Liability Directive to the EDTs, see 
Charlotte de Meeus, The Product Liability Directive at the Age of the Digital Industrial Revolution: 
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each national legal framework, and therefore, they cover a set of not uniform 
cases. Overall, disparities in Member States' legislation and case-law concerning 
liability may produce distortions of competition and impair the smooth 
functioning of the single digital market,35 while the moderate pace with which 
the European legislator usually proceeds with legislative harmonization may no 
longer be adequate to keep up with the rapid changes brought by EDTs.36  
 
 
II. NEW TECHNOLOGIES, NEW FEATURES 
 
Against the background of the current liability regime(s) in Europe, the 
question arises as to whether they are fit for the new digital era comes from the 
fact that EDTs present features that are unknown to the previous generation of 
technologies. Namely: complexity, opacity, autonomy, predictability, openness, 
data-drivenness, and vulnerability.37 Even though these features are gradual in 
nature, their combination may, however, seriously challenge the traditional 
liability notions.  
On the one hand, EDTs demonstrate a high degree of complexity due to the 
interdependency between the different components and layers, ranging from 
tangible parts and devices (e.g. sensors, actuators, hardware), to software 
components, data, and connectivity features. The presence of numerous 
interdependencies in the value chain increases the variety of players involved, 
which in turn amplifies the overall complication. In addition, the more complex 
EDTs become, the less those exposed to them can comprehend the processes 
that may have caused harm to themselves or to others.  
The opacity of these systems may only increase when self-learning features 
are in place, as algorithms no longer come as readable code but amount to black 
boxes that are almost impossible to understand.  
It is this same self-learning capability that makes EDTs autonomous, i.e. 
capable of performing tasks and interact with the surrounding environment with 
less, or entirely without, human control or supervision. Many of the operations 
provided through and by EDTs can be almost fully autonomous, as IoT-devices, 
advanced robots and all systems empowered by AI are developing increased 
capabilities to interpret the environment (via sensing, actuating, cognitive vision, 
machine learning, etc.), to interact with humans, to cooperate with other actors, 
to learn new behaviours, and execute actions autonomously without human 
 
 
35 Awareness of this can be found in Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), 2000 O.J. (L 178) 40. 
36 Jorge Morais Carvalho & Kristin Nemeth, Time for a Change? Product Liability in the Digital Era, J. 
OF EUROPEAN CONSUMER AND MARKET L. 160 (2019). 
37 With specific regard to AI, an additional feature has been flagged as riskful: AI intrinsic 
monomaniacality towards its objectives, which is especially dangerous when AI autonomously makes 
decisions and interacts with third parties. The main AI goals are in fact: (i) preserving itself in order to 
maximize the satisfaction of its final objectives, (ii) preserving the content of its final objectives; (iii) 
improving its rationality, intelligence and decision-making process, to maximize the satisfaction of the 
final objectives; (iv) acquiring as many resources as possible for the satisfaction of the final objectives 
of the AI. All this could lead to unexpected risks and make traditional liability rules unsuitable. See, 
Giovanni Comandè, Intelligenza artificiale e responsabilità tra liability e accountability. Il carattere 
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intervention. However, the more autonomous systems are, the less they depend 
on other players (i.e. manufacturers, owners, users, etc.), the greater their impact 
on their environment and on third parties is.38  
From the ability to operate autonomously by virtue of their interaction with 
the environment derives EDTs’ unpredictability. Many systems are in fact 
designed to not only respond to pre-defined stimuli, but to identify and classify 
new ones and link them to self-chosen corresponding reactions that have not 
been pre-programmed as such. To do this they rely on the data they have been 
trained with, as well as the data that they keep collecting while interacting with 
the surrounding environment, which in turn alters the initial algorithms. As a 
result, the more external data systems are capable of processing, the more 
difficult it becomes to foresee the precise impact that they will have once in 
operation. 
On the other hand, in order to operate and self-develop, EDTs depend on 
external information that is not pre-installed but generated by built-in sensors or 
communicated from the outside by data sources, in other words they are data-
driven. This exposes these new technologies to issues whenever the data is 
flawed or missing, due to an error in communication or in relation to the external 
or internal source. Strictly linked to the data-driveness is the feature of openness. 
In order to operate EDTs need not only to interact with data sources but also 
with other systems. They are in fact not completed once put into circulation, 
rather, for their nature, they depend upon subsequent inputs, such as updates and 
upgrades. For these reasons, EDTs are deemed to be “open by design,” so to 
permit external input either via some hardware plugin or through some wireless 
connection. However, this constant interaction with outside information is what 
also makes these new technologies vulnerable to cybersecurity breaches, which 
can cause the systems to malfunction and/or modify its features in a way likely 
to cause harm.  
All the above-mentioned features, combined with the lack of clear legal 
requirements for EDTs, make more difficult for enforcement authorities to check 
compliance with applicable legislation and assess liability. In particular, 
individuals and legal entities having suffered harm from EDTs products may 
lack the means to verify possible breaches of laws, thus prejudicing their 
effective access to justice. At the same time, market surveillance and 
enforcement authorities may lack adequate technical capabilities for inspecting 
EDT systems. In some instances, they may not be empowered to act or even be 
uncertain on whether they do have such powers. For instance, the PLD 
establishes liability of the manufacturer for damage caused by a defective 
product. However, it is not easy at all to prove a defect in an autonomous vehicle 
or retrace its decision-making process leading to a car accident, with the 
consequence of making more difficult to meet the burden of proof and obtain 
compensation under the current EU and national liability legislation. To this 
 
 
38 Autonomous capabilities and intelligence ungoverned by human directions or supervision could lead 
to unexpected outcomes, as shown by the story of Alice and Bob, i.e., two chatbots developed to learn 
autonomous bargaining skills that started to interact using their own code, indecipherable for humans. 
Andrew Griffin, Facebook's artificial intelligence robots shut down after they start talking to each 
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regard, transparency and explainability of algorithms embedded in EDTs should 
be legally required to help courts to analyse the functioning process of 
algorithms, identify any flaw and, accordingly, assign appropriate responsibility 
for failures in decision-making.39  
 
 
III. NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND TRADITIONAL LIABILITY NOTIONS 
 
Because of their features, EDTs raise several open questions as to the 
capacity of the known liability regimes to encompass the harm generated by their 
use. Indeed, besides the well-known issues of lack of accountability40 and 
transparency,41 EDTs do challenge traditional liability concepts such as 
damages, causal link, and duty of care. 
As for the notion of damages, in addition to traditional damages (harm to 
persons and properties), there are also those connected with the transfer of data, 
privacy, and confidential information security. Interconnected devices may also 
constitute targets of cyber-attacks: in the case of smart homes, for example, poor 
security measures at design, manufacturing or operation stage may allow cyber-
attackers to take control of a device and modify its functioning or the functioning 
of other smart devices in the same ecosystem. Now, while injuries to a person 
or to a physical property can trigger liability, compensation of pure economic 
loss is not universally accepted, nor is the case of destruction of data as property 
loss. Similarly, in the scenario in which personality rights are adversely affected, 
such as the case in which data is released in violation of the right to privacy, 
differences exist among jurisdictions.  
The most controversial element of the liability regime is, however, the 
causal link between the victim’s harm and the defendant’s sphere. In principle, 
in tort law the victim should show that the damage originated by some conduct 
or risk attributable to the defendant. However, in the case of EDTs such a proof 
can become quite difficult. Interconnected devices, for example, such as smart 
homes or AVs, are the result of a combination of hardware, software, 
connectivity and data, which may make it impossible to identify the real source 
of the damage. Providing evidence of causation is even harder when dealing with 
self-learning AI systems fueled by machine learning and deep learning 
techniques and based on multiple external data collection. Advanced robots and 
all products empowered by AI may in fact act in ways that were not envisaged 
at the time that the system was first put into operation, and these behaviours may 
be so autonomous to interrupt the causal link. In a strict liability regime, such a 
proof could be less problematic as it would be enough to be to prove that the risk 
triggering the strict liability materialised; however, strict liability only applies in 
very limited cases. 
As liability is mainly fault-based, the other fundamental element that the use 
of EDTs challenges is the definition of the duty of care that the perpetrator 
should have discharged; behaviour that caused then the damage. While statutory 
 
 
39 Miriam C. Buiten, Towards Intelligent Regulation of Artificial Intelligence, 10(1) EUR. J. OF RISK 
REG. 41, 55 (2019). 
40 Mayaan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in Algorithmic 
Enforcement, 69 FLORIDA L. REV., 181 (2017). 








218 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.  vol. XI:2 
language may in certain cases define such duties, in many others they are 
reconstructed by the court based on social beliefs about the prudent and 
reasonable course of action in the circumstances at stake. In the case of EDTs, a 
lack of well-established models of proper functioning of these technologies and 
the fact that they develop as a result of learning without direct human control 
makes it difficult to apply fault-based liability rules. While the processes running 
AI systems cannot all be measured according to duties of care designed for 
human conduct, an accepted standard of care for the creation and operation of 
autonomous systems has not emerged yet.  
Moreover, in some instances it may be hard even to identify the person 
obliged to meet such duty of care. In fact, it could be unfair or inefficient to 
assign liability for any damage caused by an AI product always to the designer 
of the algorithm. Liability should be allocated also to owners and/or users, 
depending on the circumstances, but the features of EDTs products make such 
allocation of liability not self-evident at all.42 However, according to national 
liability regimes, tracing a damage back to a specific person is still a fundamental 
prerequisite for any fault-based claim.43 Such difficulties have prompted some 
scholars to suggest alternative options that would revolutionize traditional 
liability notions. In particular, some scholars urge for joint and several liability 
of all subjects involved in the design, programming and deployment of an AI 
application.44 However, while this would represent a much appreciated 
simplification for users claiming compensation for damage, it might be 
ineffective in properly allocating costs and, consequently, setting optimally 
prevention incentives for all relevant players.45  
Others argue that if AI is an intelligence even able to supersede humans in 
a number of areas, such intelligence could be at fault sometimes and, 
accordingly, it should be held directly liable. This would require to 
reconceptualize intelligent and autonomous machines as entities with the status 
of a “person” under the law. With such legal fiction, machines could bear 
liability in case of wrongdoing in a way similar to that of legal entities such as 
corporations.46 However, this may open up more problems than it solves, 
 
 
42 For instance, with regard to autonomous weapons: “somehow human responsibility and accountability 
for the actions taken by the machine evaporate and disappear. The soldier in the field cannot be 
expected to understand in any serious way the programming of the machine; the designers and 
programmers operate on a completely different legal standard; the operational planners could not know 
exactly how the machine would perform in the fog of war; and finally, there might be no human actors 
left standing to hold accountable”. Kenneth Anderson, Matthew C. Waxman, Debating Autonomous 
Weapon Systems, their Ethics, and their Regulation under International Law, in R. BROWNSWORD, E. 
SCOTFORD, K. YEUNG (EDS), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW, REGULATION AND TECHNOLOGY 
1097, 1110 (Oxford University Press 2017). 
43 European Commission, On Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust, 
19.02.20, COM (2020) 65 final, https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/white-paper-artificial-
intelligence-european-approach-excellence-and-trust_en. 
44 David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. 
L. REV. 117, 149 (2014). 
45 Giovanni Comandé, Multilayered (Accountable) Liability for Artificial Intelligence, in SEBASTIAN 
LOHSSE, REINER SCHULZE & DIRK STAUDENMAYER (EDS), LIABILITY FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS 165, 175 (Hart Publishing Nomos 2019). 
46 See generally, Jaap Hage, Theoretical foundations for the responsibility of autonomous agents, 25 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE L. 255 (2017); Brandon W. Jackson, Artificial Intelligence and the Fog of 
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particularly as to the definition of selection criteria and equity requirements, as 
well as to the allocation of costs among all parties involved in the development 
and use of AI applications.47 In any case, today at least, legislators and courts 
seem far from revolutionizing the traditional notions of liability to introduce 
some sort of robot’s fault. 
Rather than resorting to conceptually new theories, another – maybe more 
viable – option that has been proposed is that of introducing a predetermined, 
detailed and acceptable level of care (or quasi-safe-harbor) for designers, 
manufacturers, owners and users of EDTs: if the level of care is unmet, a 
presumption of negligence and, therefore, liability would be triggered; if met, 
the defendant would enjoy a quasi-safe harbor, while the claimant would bear 
the burden of proving actual negligence.48 
 
 
IV. THE EU POLICY ON LIABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF EDTS 
 
The debate on whether the current liability regime is fit for accommodating 
the issues described above is quite lively within the European Union,49 in 
particular as to what extent the existing liability schemes are adapted to the 
emerging market realities that follow the development of new technologies such 
as AI, advanced robotics, IoT, and the like. In this regard, the EU institutions 
have adopted a series of documents that in part tackle to topic, in part highlight 
the need for further analysis.  
For example, in February 2017, the European Parliament adopted a 
Resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics with recommendation to the 
Commission,50 which proposed a whole range of legislative and non-legislative 
initiatives in the field of robotics and AI. In particular, it asked the Commission 
to submit a proposal for a legislative instrument providing civil law rules on the 
liability of robots and AI, an initiative so far disregarded. In February 2018, the 
European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) published a study on “[a] 
common EU approach to liability rules and insurance for connected and 
autonomous vehicles,”51 as an added value assessment accompanying the 
Resolution on Civil Law Rules. On April 25, 2018, the Commission published 
 
 
CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. 35 (2019). This debate has a long history, as shown by Lawrence B. Solum, 
Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70(4) NORTH CAROLINA L. REV. 1231 (1992). A case 
against treating robots like humans is made by Horst Eidenmüller, The Rise of Robots and the Law of 
Humans, J. OF EUR. CONSUMER AND MKT. L., 765 (2017). 
47 Giovanni Comandè, Intelligenza artificiale e responsabilità, supra note 37, at 180. 
48 Omri Rachum-Twaig, Whose Robot Is It Anyway?: Liability for Artificial-Intelligence-Based Robots, 
U. OF ILLINOIS L. REV. 1141, 1172-73 (2020). 
49 For an analysis of the extent to which tort law may provide remedies to subjects injured by new 
technologies in the common law (Anglo-American) tradition see Jonathan Morgan, Torts and 
Technology, in ROGER BROWNSWORD, ET AL., (EDS), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW, REGULATION 
AND TECHNOLOGY 522 (Oxford University Press 2017). 
50 Resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, EUR. PARL. DOC. 2015/2103(INL) (2017), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0051_EN.html. See also, an analysis in 
Laura Coppini, Robotica e intelligenza artificiale: questioni di responsabilità civile, 4 POLITICA DEL 
DIRITTO 713 (2018). 
51 Tatjana Evas, A common EU approach to liability rules and insurance for connected and autonomous 
vehicles, European Added Value Assessment Accompanying the European Parliament's Legislative 
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a “Staff Working Document on Liability for Emerging Digital Technologies,”52 
accompanying the Commission’s Communication on Artificial Intelligence for 
Europe,53 which provides the starting point of the discussions on liability and 
EDTs.  
All these documents, as well as the following Sibiu Communication of May 
2019,54 stress that a robust regulatory framework should address the ethical and 
legal questions surrounding AI, including those related to liability. In its 2018 
AI Communication, the Commission also announced the adoption of a report 
assessing the implications of emerging digital technologies on existing safety 
and liability frameworks by mid-2019. In its 2019 Work Programme, it 
confirmed it would “continue work on the emerging challenge of Artificial 
Intelligence by enabling coordinated action across the European Union.”55 
Accordingly, on April 2019, the high-level Expert Group on Artificial 
Intelligence set up by the European Commission listed liability frameworks 
among the non-technical methods for securing and maintaining a lawful and 
trustworthy AI,56 on the assumption that an environment of trust is crucial for 
fully reaping the benefits of innovation.57 
In order to provide an answer, in March 2018, the Commission set up an 
Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies,58 operating in two different 
formations: the Product Liability Directive formation and the New Technologies 
formation. This second formation was in particular asked to assess “whether and 
to what extent existing liability schemes are adapted to the emerging market 
realities following the development of the new technologies such as Artificial 
Intelligence, advanced robotics, the IoT and cybersecurity issues.”59  The experts 
were requested to examine whether the current liability regimes are still 
“adequate to facilitate the uptake of . . . new technologies by fostering 
investment stability and users’ trust.”60 In case of shortcomings, the expert group 
 
 
52 Commission Staff Working Document, Liability for emerging digital technologies, accompanying the 
document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
Artificial intelligence for Europe, SWD/2018/137 final (2018). 
53 Communication of the European Commission, Artificial Intelligence for Europe,      COM (2018) 237 
final (Apr. 25, 2018), .https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018SC0137. 
54 European Commission, Preparing for a more united, stronger and more democratic Union in an 
increasingly uncertain world, contribution to the informal EU27 leaders' meeting in Sibiu (Romania), 
(May 9, 2019), .https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/euco_sibiu_communication_en.pdf. 
55 Communication of the European Commission, Commission Work Programme 2019: delivering what 
we promised and preparing for the future, COM (2018) 800 final, (Oct. 23, 2018),   
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/cwp_2019_en.pdf. 
56 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, at 6, 22, 
(Apr. 8, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/ai-alliance-consultation/guidelines.  
57 Communication of the European Commission, Building Trust in Human-Centric Artificial 
Intelligence, COM (2019) 168 final (Apr. 8, 2019), 
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58 See European Commission Expert Groups, Expert Group on liability and new technologies, (Mar. 9, 
2018), 
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was invited to make recommendations for amendments, without being limited 
to existing national and EU legal instruments. However, recommendations were 
to be limited to matters of extracontractual liability, leaving aside in particular 
corresponding (and complementary) rules on safety and other technical 
standards. As a result of the expert group’s activity in November 2019 the Report 
“Liability for Artificial Intelligence and other Emerging Digital Technologies”61 
was published. This undertakes an assessment of existing liability regimes in the 
wake of emerging technologies and it concludes that the current ones in force in 
the Member States ensure at least basic protection of victims whose damage is 
caused by the operation of such new technologies, while also hinting to the 
adjustments that might be needed.62 
The need for some adjustments is confirmed by the recently adopted White 
Paper on artificial intelligence to foster excellence and trust63 and by the Report 
on the safety and liability implications of Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of 
Things and robotics.64 Both documents stress the ultimate goal being to ensure 
remediation of damage caused by emerging digital technologies and overall 
reliability, while promoting investment stability and, more generally, 
innovation. In this context, efficient liability rules are indeed paramount for 
trustworthiness, which in turn is a prerequisite for the uptake of emerging digital 
technologies. Pursuing such a strategy is also deemed a crucial step to strengthen 
European technology sovereignty and affirms the role of the European Union on 
the international stage as “the most attractive, secure and dynamic data-agile 
economy in the world,”65 despite a fierce global competition.66  
For the purpose of achieving these goals, the European Commission 
suggests a regulatory and investment-oriented approach, entailing, among other 
things, adjustments to current European and national liability regimes. Indeed, a 
fragmented legal landscape sprinkled of different national initiatives could lead 
to the fragmentation of the single market and, consequently, endanger not just 
legal certainty, but also the emergence of a dynamic and flourishing European 
industry. For this reason, the European Commission stresses the importance of 
aligning the efforts at European, national, and regional level,67 while promoting 
 
 
61 Report, supra note 22. 
62 See infra para. 5. 
63 White Paper, supra note 43. 
64 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic 
and Social Committee, Report on the safety and liability implications of Artificial Intelligence, the 
Internet of Things and robotics, COM (2020) 64 final (Feb. 19, 2020), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2020%3A64%3AFIN. 
65 White Paper, supra note 43, at 3. 
66 The European Union is closely involved in EDTs-related work which is ingoing in multilateral fora, 
including the Council of Europe, the United Nations (UN) the United Nations Educational Scientific 
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Development’s (OECD), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU). For instance, the European Union has contributed to development 
of the OECD’s ethical principles for AI, subsequently endorsed by the G20 in its June 2019 Ministerial 
Statement on Trade and Digital Economy, see generally Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
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67 Stronger coordination is encouraged in Communication of the European Commission, see 
Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence, COM (2018) 795 final (Dec. 7, 2018), 
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partnership between the private and the public sector towards an “ecosystem of 
excellence” with proper incentives to research, innovation and deployment,68 an 
“ecosystem of trust” duly protecting fundamental rights and consumers’ rights69 
such as privacy and non-discrimination,70 and through liability rules.   
In line with the Report from the expert group, the European Commission’s 
analysis of the current legal frameworks concludes for the adaptations of current 
norms and the adoption of new specific legislation, pursuing a targeted, risk-
based approach, and ensuring effective enforcement. In order to address both 
current and anticipated technological, societal and commercial developments, 
such revised regulatory framework should effectively balance protection and 
innovation, while not being excessively prescriptive and burdensome for 
businesses. 
In addition, establishing a European governance structure with specific 
regard to EDTs could foster a fruitful cooperation of national competent 
authorities for a number of tasks, including identification of emerging trends, 
exchange of information and best practice, advise on standards and 
certifications, stakeholders’ participation, audits and assessments.71 
 
 
V. THE REPORT ON LIABILITY FOR AI AND EMERGING DIGITAL 
TECHNOLOGIES: A CALL FOR ADJUSTMENTS? 
 
Among the several communications and documents issued by European 
institutions, the Report on Liability for Artificial Intelligence and other emerging 
digital technologies (“Report”) that has been recently adopted by the Expert 
 
 
European Commission, Member States, Norway, and Switzerland for some 70 joint actions in the 
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also the results of the public consultation on the White Paper, see supra note 43, at 5. 
68 To foster investments, the European Commission has proposed a number of measures under the Digital 
Europe Programme, Horizon Europe and the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021 to 2027. On 
this, see European Commission, Info session Horizon 2020: Artificial intelligence for manufacturing, 
(Nov. 18, 2019), .https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/info-session-horizon-2020-
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Rights Directive 2011/83, 2011 O.J. (L 304/64) (EC). 
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Group appointed by the European Commission72 represents detailed and 
insightful indications on the way in which the EU intend addressing the issue of 
EDTs and liability. Interestingly enough, in its assessment of existing liability 
regimes in the wake of emerging digital technologies, the expert group 
concludes that the rules in force in the Member States ensure at least basic 
protection of victims for damages generated in the use of EDTs. However, the 
specific characteristics of these technologies and their applications make it more 
difficult to offer these victims a claim for compensation in all cases where this 
seems justified. It may also be the case that the allocation of liability is unfair or 
inefficient. To rectify this, it is likely that some adjustments need to be made to 
EU and national liability regimes. By saying this, the Report confirms the issue-
oriented approach that the EU institutions have adopted within the Single Market 
Strategy.73 
Being therefore aware that a size-fits-all solution is not possible, the Report 
identifies four main categories where adjustments may be needed: (i) cases 
where a (reinterpreted) product liability can still be applied; (ii) cases in which 
strict liability should be extended also to other entities; (iii) cases in which there 
is the need to further develop the notion of duty of care; and (iv) cases that can 
be addresses though vicarious liability, by equalling the device to a human 
auxiliary.  
 
A. TOWARD A (REINTERPRETED) PRODUCT LIABILITY 
 
As a starter, product liability remains a very useful tool to address the 
damages that may occur in the use of EDTs, as long as a defect can be 
identified.74 However, to use product liability, there are some adjustments that 
the current regime introduced by the PLD needs to undertake. After all, the PLD 
was adopted in a completely different context from the current one, more than 
thirty years old in the pre-digital age.75  
In the first place, the PLD should be interpreted in a way that it encompasses 
also digital content and services (for example, health, financial, and transport 
services based on stand-alone software leveraging AI technology) and not just 
tangible products. Such extensions to stand-alone algorithms could be justified 
by the rationale of the PLD itself, adopted exactly to address the issues posed by 
the mass distribution of standardised products available to the general public.76 
While once digital content might not have been commonly used, nowadays, it 
fulfils many of the functions that tangible movable items used to when the PLD 
was drafted and adopted. For this reason, damages caused by defective digital 
content should trigger the producer’s liability, in particular in the case in which 
defective digital elements are linked to other products, some of which come 
separately from the tangible item (for example, an application to be downloaded 
into the user’s house assistant), or in the case of updates taking place after a 
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product has entered the market.77 In the second place, it is likely that if the digital 
content is defective, it will be extremely hard for the claimant to identify the 
causal link between the harm and the defect. In these cases, therefore, an 
inversion of the burden of proof might be needed, or at least the burden of proof 
should be alleviated with regard to the causal relationship between a defect and 
the damage. Lastly, the possibility for the producers to invoke the 
unpredictability of the defect should be eliminated in those cases in which it was 
foreseeable that the technology would develop unpredictably. In other words, 
the risk development defence, which allows the producer to avoid liability for 
unforeseeable defects, should not be available in cases where it was predictable 
that unforeseen developments might occur.78 
In addition to the recommendations of the Report, it could be argued that 
existing legislation focuses on the safety risks present at the time that a product 
is placed on the market. However, proper attention should be given to changing 
functionalities of EDTs systems, in light of the fact that the frequency of 
software updates and the ever-evolving features of machine learning may entail 
important product changes during their lifecycle, thus posing risks unexpected 
at the time of placing on the market. This is especially true in the event that AI 
software is integrated into a product when the latter is already on the market. In 
these circumstances, it should be mandatory to conduct new risks assessments 
and implement adequate measures, including the obligation to maintain 
transparency, human oversight and quality of data throughout the product 
lifecycle.79 
Also, it could be argued that the scope of application should be extended. 
On the one hand, while the PLD regulates liability of manufacturers, it is still up 
to Member States to govern liability of others in the supply chain. It would be 
advisable to properly allocate responsibilities among different economic 
operators at the European level, and to require cooperation among economic 
operators in the supply chain, and with users as well. On the other hand, the 
concept of safety itself is subject to changes, along with the constant evolution 
of the threat landscape and the possible categories of damage. For instance, risks 
deriving from loss of connectivity are not yet explicitly addressed in current 
legislation, nor more apparently futuristic risks such as mental ones resulting 
from user collaboration with humanoid robots. Accordingly, the notion of safety 
should be clarified and broadened.80 
Another notion which may no longer be adequate, especially in light of the 
widespread use of software, is that of defect.81 In fact, the mere fact that a 
 
 
77 This is also in line with what was provided in two recently published directives: Directive (EU) 
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80 Id. at 15. 
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product with an embedded algorithm causes harm does not make it defective. 
All the methods traditionally adopted by courts to establish a defect  may not be 
always suitable for algorithms—in particular, (i) proof of malfunctioning may 
not be obvious in the event of a  wrong medical diagnosis delivered by an AI 
system, as it may not necessarily derive from defective design; (ii) proof of the 
breach of safety standards may not be a viable path if they are not updated as 
quickly as technology develops; (iii) comparing risks and benefits associated to 
the use of a product may not be straightforward when they are of different nature, 
except, for instance, for pharmaceutical products where risks and benefits have 
the same nature; (iv) comparing two competing products would be hard when it 
comes to algorithms, because the overall outcomes should be taken into account, 
rather than the result of each algorithm in a single set of circumstances. In any 
case, the fact that an algorithm is less good than another one does not necessarily 
make the former defective. Otherwise, the market would have only one non-
defective algorithm at time—the best one; and (v) a comparison with what a 
reasonable person would have done in the same circumstances would be tricky 
when AI is involved, especially considering that recourse to AI is usually 
justified by the assumption that it performs better than humans.82  
The difficulties surrounding the notions of fault and defect in relation to 
EDTs could encourage a shift from fault-based liability to strict liability. 
 
B. STRICT LIABILITY  
 
In relation to strict liability, the Report states that this could be appropriate 
only when the risks generated by the EDTs concretize in a public space. If this 
is the case, the person who is in control of the risk connected with the operation 
of the EDT and who benefits from its operation should be held liable.83 In 
practice, this is the regime that already applies in some Member States to 
autonomous vehicles and in some cases that applies also to drones. However, 
the situation varies significantly among jurisdictions, for example in relation to 
the coverage of economic loss, which is provided only in few countries. Instead, 
EDTs that move in public spaces (namely vehicles, drones and the like) are 
likely to require a general rule of strict liability within the whole single digital 
market for the significant harm to third parties that they can cause.  
Interestingly enough, the Report also points out that, in particular in the 
context of autonomous cars, the concept of operators is preferable to that of 
“owner”, “user” or “keeper” of the technology.84 While, in the past, the vast 
majority of accidents used to be caused by human error, in the future most 
accidents will be caused by the malfunctioning of technology, though not 
necessarily of the autonomous vehicle itself. The term “operator” refers to the 
person who is in control of the risk connected with the operation of EDTs and 
who benefits from such operation. For example, in the case of a fleet of 
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autonomous vehicles, the operator is likely to be the entity that organizes, 
maintains and offers the services and it is on the operator that a strict liability 
regime should be imposed on, without the exclusion of product liability on the 
side of the producer in case of a defective element. 
While it may not be desirable to apply a strict liability regime to any damage 
caused by EDTs, it may be sensible to do so with regard to specific sectors, such 
as autonomous vehicles, domestic robots and medicine.85 
 
C. THE NOTION OF DUTY OF CARE  
 
In the opinion of the experts the issue which is likely to require further 
attention is the identification of a duty of care, whereby in the use of EDTs, the 
acting person should apply ordinary prudence as applied by the pater familias (a 
Roman law concept) under similar circumstances, in view of an objective 
business rationale and the features of EDTs’ environment. While it is known 
that, in the case of more traditional technologies, operators have to discharge a 
range of duties of care that span from the choice of technology—in particular in 
light of the tasks to be performed and the operator’s own skills and abilities—to 
the organisational framework—in particular with regard to proper training and 
monitoring—and to maintenance, the real contours of a duty of care in the use 
of EDTs is still to be established.86 In order to refine the concept of duty of care 
in the context of EDTs, Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and, accordingly, 
liability mitigation strategies could point the way.87 
In addition, the Report also highlights the need to consider that producers 
have to share part of this enhanced duty of care by designing, describing and 
marketing products in a way effectively enabling operators to comply with their 
duties; and by adequately monitoring the product after putting it into 
circulation.88 This is because the more advanced technologies become, the more 
difficult it is for operators to develop the right skills and discharge all duties. 
While the risk of insufficient skills should still be borne by the operators, it 
would be unfair to leave producers entirely out of the equation.  
 
D. VICARIOUS LIABILITY  
 
One option proposed for addressing the risks of emerging digital technology 
is the potential expansion of the notion of vicarious liability, which could be 
applied to situations where autonomous technologies are used in place of human 
auxiliaries.89 In other words, when harm is caused by an autonomous technology 
used in a way functionally equivalent to the employment of a human auxiliary, 
the operator’s liability for making use of the technology should correspond to 
the existing vicarious liability regime of a principal for its own auxiliaries. This 
equivalent application encounters however two main issues. Firstly, vicarious 
liability regimes are modelled primarily on human behaviours, while in the case 
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of a technological auxiliary there is not a human behaviour to assess. Secondly, 
vicarious liability regimes are highly different across Member States and the 
recourse to them runs the risk to incremental increase in the degree of 
fragmentation. Now, the first obstacle may be overcome by deciding that when 
an autonomous technology outperforms a human auxiliary, the duty of care 
should be determined by the performance of a comparable available technology 
which the operator could be expected to use.90 The fragmentation issue however 
cannot be overcome without intervening on the Member States’ national 
regimes.  
 
E. LOGGING BY DESIGN, COMMERCIAL OR TECHNOLOGICAL UNITS 
 
Beside the adjustment so far mentioned, the Report introduces two main 
novelties that ought to be carefully considered as they are likely to significantly 
contribute to govern the issue of EDTs and liability in the near future. These 
amount to the requirement of logging by design91 and to the notion of 
commercial or technological units.92  
As to the former, EDTs offer unprecedented possibilities of reliable and 
detailed documentation of events that may enable the identification of what has 
caused an accident. This can usually be done using log files, which is why the 
expert group suggests to impose, under certain circumstances, a duty to provide 
for appropriate logging and to disclose the data to the victim in a readable format. 
The real innovation though is about the effects of a lack of compliance with the 
logging obligations, which would trigger a rebuttable presumption that the 
condition of liability to be proven by the missing information is fulfilled.93 In 
other words, the absence of logged information—or the failure to give the victim 
reasonable access to it—would reverse the burden of proof and significantly ease 
the life of a claimant. 
As to the latter—the notion of commercial or technological unit—it refers 
to the digital ecosystem that two or more persons cooperate to create on a 
contractual or similar basis. A commercial or technological unit is a notion that 
becomes very useful in complex contexts such as the Internet of the Things, 
where it becomes almost impossible for the claimant to identify a specific 
tortfeasor.94 In such a case all the entities that are part of the unit—for example 
all the diverse producers or operators of the various devices that contribute to 
the creation of a smart house—are to be considered part of the same unit and—
in the expert group’s opinion—to be deemed jointly and severally liable.95 The 
reason why such a notion ought to be adopted is that it would avoid the risk to 
undercompensate victims of damages derived from complex technologies as 
compared with those that are damaged by technologies that are manufactured or 
operated by just one clearly identifiable producer. In determining, finally, what 
counts as a commercial and technological unit the Report pinpoints several 
elements, among which a joint or coordinated marketing activity for the different 
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elements of the complex EDT at issue; the degree of their technical 
interdependency and interoperation; and lastly the degree of specificity or 
exclusivity of their combination.96  
 
 
VI. COMPLEMENTING LIABILITY: SOFT LAW, ACCOUNTABILITY AND USERS’ 
EMPOWERMENT, COMPENSATION FUNDS AND INSURANCE SCHEMES 
 
The question of remedying damage deriving from the use of EDTs ignites 
the debate between those who would favor the free development of the market 
and those who invoke the expansion of the rules of liability, as well as between 
those who believe in the adequacy of the current legal framework and those who 
instead emphasize the need to introduce ad hoc instruments to keep up with 
technological advancements.97  
In any case, any initiative focusing just on written rules, rather than aiming 
to affect the practices and incentives of industry participants would expose to 
the risk of stifling innovation or missing the goal of compensating victims.98 It 
could be argued that the right balance between innovation and protection could 
hardly be found by industry participants alone, especially if left in an uncertain 
legal landscape as the current one, or, worse, in a regulatory vacuum. On the 
contrary, the right balance should be actively pursued by public regulators, 
following the adoption of a risk-based approach and on the basis of a continuous 
exchange of information with researchers and professionals,99 on the assumption 
that EDTs are too diverse a category – in terms of purposes, capabilities, and so 
on—to allow a one-size-fits-all approach of dealing with related liability 
issues.100 
Even after liability rules are amended according to the adjustments proposed 
in the previous sections so to properly tackle the ever-changing issues of the 
algorithmic society, the resulting liability framework would still offer remedies 
to the victims of wrongdoing after the damage occurs and a court rules in favor 
of the claimant. Instead, it would be sensible to complement such ex post 
mechanism with “soft” guidelines, codes of conduct, standards, best practices 
and human impact statements101 aimed at guiding ex ante the conduct of 
designer, developers, owners and users of EDTs, to prevent damage from 




97Marta Infantino, La responsabilità per danni algoritmici: propsettive europeo-continentali, 5 
RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE E PREVIDENZA 1762 (2019).  
98 Id. at 1801.  
99 Regulatory issues connected to AI, with a focus on the role of public and private actors, are analyzed 
in Michael Guihot, Anne F. Matthew, & Nicolas P. Suzor, Nudging Robots: Innovative Solutions to 
Regulate Artificial Intelligence, 20 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF ENTERTAINMENT AND TECHNOLOGY 
LAW 385 (2017). 
100 See Ioannis Revolidis, A & Alan Dahi, The Peculiar Case of the Mushroom Picking Robot: Extra-
contractual Liability, in Robotics, in MARCELO CORRALES, MARK FENWICK & NIKOLAUS FORGÓ 
(EDS), ROBOTICS, AI AND THE FUTURE OF LAW, PERSPECTIVES IN LAW, BUSINESS AND INNOVATION 
57 (Spring 2018). 
101 With specific regard to AI, see Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial 
Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 107–116 (2019), according to whom “in the absence of oversight, 
a mixture of industry self-regulation and whistleblower engagement offers us one path forward in the 
future direction of civil rights law to address the issues raised by AI,” especially for issues of lack of 








2021 LIABILITY AND EMERGING DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES 229 
instrument of early regulation, rather than subsequent reaction.102 Further 
advantages could stem from the fact that self-regulation is by definition 
developed by private actors—such as professional associations and committees 
of experts—who are far more knowledgeable with the technical complexities of 
EDTs than public regulators. Moreover, they could update soft law rules much 
faster than any public regulator—and this is critical to keeping up with the ever-
evolving technological landscape. 
Guidelines, standards, codes of conduct and best practices can become 
legally relevant by establishing the principle of accountability at the legislative 
level. The principle of accountability requires professionals and businesses to 
take responsibility for their initiatives and activities, by taking measures 
adequate to the level of risks and by being able to demonstrate compliance with 
law and best practices. In particular, borrowing the approach successfully 
adopted in data protection legislation,103 subjects involved in the design, 
development and use of EDTs should conduct risks assessment analyses and, 
consequently, take appropriate action from an organizational and technical 
standpoint to foresee and prevent, or at least mitigate, any risk potentially 
incurred by any stakeholder because of EDTs.104 Moreover, periodic review of 
impact assessment, combined with demonstrable governance processes, regular 
audits and contractually-binding instructions for business partners, could ensure 
a consistent level of compliance with law and soft law by all interested actors 
and stakeholders throughout the entire chain of EDTs. In this context, 
independent public authorities or private bodies could contribute with regard to 
standards, certification schemes, supervision and penalties.105 
The issues raised by EDTs could also be tackled by empowering civil 
society—an empowerment that will not be caused by market forces 
spontaneously, but should be guided by scholars and activists106 and could 
consists in providing users with greater awareness and tools for monitoring 
online markets for consumer policy purposes.107  This assumption underlies, for 
instance, the CLAUDETTE project of the European University Institute in 
Florence, i.e., a machine learning powered system aimed at automatically 
detecting non-compliant privacy policies and potentially unlawful clauses in 
online terms of service.108 
A further option could be to make mandatory for designers, developers, 
owners and users of EDTs to pay a tax, fee or contribution into a fund 
specifically established to ensure compensation for possible victims.109 As 
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suggested at the European level for drones110 and AI,111 the compensation fund 
should cover damage deriving from EDTs in relation to any inherent risk, in light 
of their characteristics and potential applications, as well as cases where an 
accident occurs and the responsible person is not identified or has failed to pay 
the due amount to the fund. 
A similar (even complementary) path has been recommended also by the 
Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies of the European 
Commission,112 as well as by the European Parliament with specific regard to 
robots: “establishing a compulsory insurance scheme where relevant and 
necessary for specific categories of robots whereby, similarly to what already 
happens with cars, producers, or owners of robots would be required to take out 
insurance cover for the damage potentially caused by their robots.”113 Such an 
option could be extended to EDTs more generally: for instance, for autonomous 
vehicles insurance could be a precondition for accessing the streets, and a “kill 
switch” could automatically disable the car in the event of missing insurance. 
After all, many legal systems already compel owners of vehicles to purchase 
third-party insurance covering damage caused to others while circulating. 
Depending on the circumstances, insurance coverage could be imposed to the 
owner alone or to a pool consisting of all parties involved in the production and 
distribution chain of EDTs, and the “insurance premium” would likely be built 
into the EDT sale price.114 However, the introduction of a compulsory insurance 
scheme raises a number of issues: for instance, how to determine when an EDT 
is sophisticated enough to require coverage, to what extent to impose such an 
obligation on manufacturers—if completely absolved, they would no longer be 
incentivized to refine safety measures—or owners or users, how to address the 
case of damage not covered by mandatory insurance policies, and so on.115  
Not even the latter solution would shield the industry from the need of 
reforming the current liability framework. On the contrary, liability insurers 
themselves support such a review in order to reduce current unpredictability of 
liability costs: ambiguity reduction and enhanced predictability would make it 
easier to set premiums for the insurance industry, which, as is well known, 
“embraces risk and abhors uncertainty”.116 In fact, the insurance market may 
simply not offer coverage for a certain risk, if missing experience makes it 
difficult to calculate it—and this could be a recurring problem with EDTs.117 At 
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the same time, one should not forget those damages that can be compensated but 
not fully insured, given that monetary compensation alone would not be enough 
in relation to, for instance, the loss of a person's life or harm to irreplaceable 
environmental goods. In such cases, tort liability plays a crucial role as a policy 
instrument.118 
All options mentioned in this work have limits to some extent, but this does 
not imply that they cannot serve a constructive role with respect to risk and 
liability distribution. Rather than looking for a one-size-fits-all solution, 
European law will have to assess and reinvent its strategy, as anchored in the 
checks and balances of the rule of law, without being harnessed in traditional 
legal theories—that can only point the way. To capitalize on the benefits of 
EDTs and prove up to the challenges raised by innovation, a multi-faceted 
approach should be pursued, whereby different regulatory and policy 
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